
Key Takeaways
MAKO Surgical was the most shorted stock on Wall Street. Investors had bet billions that the robot wouldn't work. Surgeons wouldn't adopt it. Hospitals couldn't afford it. Then Stryker paid $1.65 billion to own it.
The story moves through a category Rony Abovitz invented, an ethical standard he refused to bend, and an IPO he forced through during the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. It's the clearest case study I've seen of what separates acquisition-grade medtech companies from the rest.
Watch the full episode on YouTube
As I said on the episode: “Somebody that I've known about since I came into the industry over 12 years ago and that's Rony Abovitz… from MAKO he went on and made another company that all of us knew about which was called Magic Leap”
This post gives you the story behind the acquisition: why the shorts were wrong, what the mom rule built inside MAKO, and the decision Rony made on an airfield in 2008 that saved the company. By the end, you'll understand what separates acquisition-grade medtech from companies that just survive.
Rony Abovitz didn't set out to build a robotic surgery company. He set out to build a better outcome for joint replacement patients. That mindset shaped everything that came next.
"We actually pioneered the use of the word spatial computing. I wanted to communicate the possibilities of spatial computing and augmented reality."
— Rony Abovitz, Co-Founder and CEO, MAKO Surgical — The State of MedTech, Ep. 291
At the time, no one was talking about spatial computing in surgery. The category didn't exist. Rony had to invent the language first because without a shared definition, no one would even understand what MAKO was trying to solve.
The initial bet was simple: if you could see the surgical space in three dimensions before you cut, you'd have fewer revisions. Fewer revisions meant less suffering for patients and lower costs for hospitals. Everything about the product, the pricing, and the go-to-market strategy flowed from that one insight.
But investors didn't believe it. They shorted the stock ruthlessly.
"We were one of the most shorted stocks on Wall Street. I didn't even understand what shorts were initially. I grew to hate people who short. The idea that you make money because they're trashing your company downward felt like the dark side of the economy."
— Rony Abovitz, Co-Founder and CEO, MAKO Surgical — The State of MedTech, Ep. 291
The shorts had ammunition. Robotic surgery was untested. Surgeon adoption was questionable. The robot was expensive. On paper, MAKO was a bet against established clinical practice, established pricing, and established budgets. Everything had to work perfectly. One bad outcome, one adoption stall, one budget cut, and the whole thesis died.
Most founders would have blinked. Rony didn't.
Acquisition-grade medtech runs on something deeper than a feature list or a distribution network. The foundation is ethical, and that ethics becomes competitive advantage.
For MAKO, that was the mom rule.
"The mom rule is this: Would you, despite passing all tests, despite meeting all FDA and MDD standards, would you use this on your mom? Assuming you like your mom, or a dad or brother. It was a final ethical line. I told the team I was going to stand in front of the train and get run over, but we are not going to break the mom rule."
— Rony Abovitz, Co-Founder and CEO, MAKO Surgical — The State of MedTech, Ep. 291
This wasn't abstract. It delayed the first surgery by six months because Rony and the team weren't comfortable with the outcome profile yet. This cost money they didn't have. It risked the company's credibility. But the moment they shipped the first MAKO procedure, it had to be perfect.
The first surgery happened on a patient in Florida whose mother was one of the surgeons using the robot. One of the company's own. Not accident. Culture.
When you build that kind of firewall, two things happen. First, you build a product surgeons trust with their own family members. Second, you build a team that's aligned on something bigger than quarterly revenue. You get voluntary retention. You get founders and engineers willing to work through the dark years.
Most medtech companies get acquired because they're successful. MAKO got acquired because it became impossible to ignore.
It's 2008. The financial system is collapsing. IPO windows are closing across America. Lehman Brothers just went under. Nobody is raising capital. Nobody is going public.
MAKO was supposed to IPO anyway.
"The bankers called us and told us they were pulling the plug in the middle of the IPO. We were sitting on an airfield. It was snowing and bleak. They told us they were going to pull the plug. We said: no way. We're not stopping halfway across the canyon because if we do, it's over. The economy was collapsing. We'd run out of capital."
— Rony Abovitz, Co-Founder and CEO, MAKO Surgical — The State of MedTech, Ep. 291
Think about that decision. The company had built something real. Surgeons were adopting it. Outcomes were solid. But nobody knew that except the people inside MAKO and the surgeons using the robot. The market didn't know it yet. Wall Street had no appetite for it.
Rony's decision to IPO anyway wasn't brave in the Hollywood sense. It was the only move left. Stop halfway, and you're dead. Complete the IPO, and you might have a chance.
They completed it.
Category-defining companies don't get to stop when it gets hard. You started the category. You moved first into the market. You've got no option to retreat because there's nowhere else to go. You either build it big enough that it can't be ignored, or you die trying.

By 2013, the market had accepted Rony's thesis. Surgeons were adopting the robot in volume. Hospitals were buying the platforms. Clinical outcomes were consistently strong. The shorts were losing money by the day.
"It was close to 30 bucks. We just destroyed the shorts on that day. If you look at it, the stock went boom. 12 to 30."
— Rony Abovitz, Co-Founder and CEO, MAKO Surgical — The State of MedTech, Ep. 291
That wasn't just volatility. That was market participants realizing they'd been wrong. The category was real. The robot worked. Surgeon adoption would continue. The shorts were covering at any price.
Stryker saw what was happening. The company had proven orthopaedic robotics was viable. Clinical adoption was accelerating. Reimbursement was becoming clearer. MAKO had built something durable.
More importantly, Stryker saw that the category they'd dominated for decades was shifting. Robotics was the future of joint replacement. You could either buy that future or get disrupted by it. Stryker bought it.
The acquisition price tells you everything. $1.65 billion for a company Wall Street had bet against. That's what happens when you're right about the category and everyone else eventually figures it out.

"I think MAKO was actually built with good intent and good purpose. And not all companies are built that way. The intent was: we're going to make surgery better for lots of people and do it as ethically as possible."
— Rony Abovitz, Co-Founder and CEO, MAKO Surgical — The State of MedTech, Ep. 291
That line stuck with me because it cuts to the difference between companies that get acquired and companies that just survive.
Every medtech founder with capital thinks they're building something that matters. Most of them are. But being right about a problem isn't enough. Being right about a solution isn't enough. You need to be right about the category, and you need to build it with the kind of integrity that makes surgeons trust you with their patient's outcomes.
Rony had all three. He invented the category ("spatial computing in surgery"). He solved the problem (reducing revision rates through augmented visualization). And he built the company with standards that wouldn't bend, even when it cost money.
That's why Stryker wanted it, why the shorts eventually lost, and why MAKO became an acquisition instead of just another funded company.
The lesson for founders building novel surgical technology isn't to avoid skeptics or ignore shorts. It's to build something so obviously right that when the market finally wakes up, there's no other choice but acquisition.
If you're building orthopaedic, cardiovascular, or neuro robotics and you're interested in the market engineering required to own a category, read the medtech exit playbook. It's the same framework Rony used at MAKO.
How much did Stryker pay for MAKO Surgical?
Stryker acquired MAKO Surgical for $1.65 billion in 2013. The acquisition represented a massive return for early investors and proved that the market for surgical robotics had solidified after years of skepticism. MAKO's stock price went from roughly $12 to $30 in the months leading to the acquisition as the shorts covered and institutional investors recognized the category was real.
Why was MAKO Surgical the most shorted stock on Wall Street?
MAKO was heavily shorted because investors doubted the company on three counts. First, robotic surgery was unproven in orthopaedics, and critics questioned whether surgeons would adopt the technology. Second, hospitals were perceived as price-sensitive, and skeptics bet that customers couldn't afford the MAKO system. Third, reimbursement for robotic procedures was uncertain, which threatened the unit economics. The shorts were betting that all three risks would sink the company before it could prove its thesis in volume.
What happened to MAKO after Stryker acquired it?
After Stryker's acquisition, MAKO Surgical became the orthopaedic robotics division of one of the world's largest medical device companies. Stryker used its distribution network, reimbursement expertise, and hospital relationships to scale MAKO's platform globally. The integration accelerated surgeon adoption and hospital placement of the robotic systems. MAKO went from a pre-commercial startup fighting for credibility to an established category with institutional backing and reach, which locked in market dominance for Stryker in orthopaedic robotics.
What is spatial computing in surgery?
Spatial computing in surgery refers to the use of three-dimensional visualization, augmented reality, and computer guidance to help surgeons see and navigate the surgical space with greater precision before and during the procedure. MAKO Surgical pioneered this approach in orthopaedic surgery, allowing surgeons to plan joint replacements in 3D based on patient anatomy, then use real-time guidance during surgery to execute the plan with robotic assistance. The result is fewer revisions, better implant positioning, and improved patient outcomes. Spatial computing has become standard language in surgical technology.
Rony Abovitz's full account of building MAKO Surgical from the 2008 IPO crisis through the Stryker acquisition is on The State of MedTech. Subscribe wherever you listen to podcasts.
Rony Abovitz co-founded MAKO Surgical in 2004 and served as CEO through its $1.65 billion acquisition by Stryker in 2013. He subsequently founded Magic Leap, the augmented reality company. He is an inventor, entrepreneur, and advocate for building medtech with ethical purpose at its core.
Omar Khateeb is the founder of MarketCraft and host of The State of MedTech, the number one podcast in the medtech industry. He works with medtech founders and commercial leaders on market engineering, commercialisation strategy, and revenue growth. Visit marketcraft.ai or subscribe to The State of MedTech for weekly conversations with the people building the future of medical devices.